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The cover of Newsweek magazine, Aug. 31,1981, parodies Michel-
angelo's painting of the Creation. God, in physician's white lab coat 
and stethoscope, hovers over and reaches out to the hand of Adam, 
who is stretching upward from a hospital bed. In block letters across 
the cover is the title of that issue's feature article, " When Doctors Play 
God: The Ethics of Life-and-Death Decisions." Advances in the 
biosciences over the past generation have pressed human reasoning 
again and again to what philosopher-theologians call boundary 
situations. Questions not only of quality of life but also of the mean-
ing of life and death have been raised insistently to confront us. 
Decisions on questions and problems that did not even exist 20-30 
years ago because technology had not yet made raising them necessary 
are being forced upon us. With this venture into uncharted territory, 
the ambiguity and responsibility which are placed on us have caused 
many to ask not only which way to go but whether to go at all. It is in 
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this context that the phrase "playing God" has come into some prom-
inence, for it seems to be suggested that in moving too far into this 
boundary situation, human action is usurping the divine prerogative 
and is, at best, morally questionable. 
It is the purpose of this paper to explore the concept of playing 
God - to determine, if possible, its meaning or meanings and its 
usefulness as an ethical concept. Though the phrase is often used in 
popular speech or literature as a slogan, it seems not to have been, as 
such, the object of much serious philosophic or theological analysis. 
Because of the lack of such scholarly treatment of this concept, this 
discussion will begin with an analysis of the theme at the level of its 
popular usage. In doing so, the critique presented is aimed at certain 
underlying assumptions in popular religious ideology. While these 
assumptions may have links to a variety of theological traditions, they 
do not seem to be direct applications of them. My goal in this essay is 
threefold. (1) By analyzing the popular use of the concept, I wish to 
clarify to the ethicist, physician and other professionals the complex 
of ideas with which they may be confronted. This should assist in 
interpreting some public reaction to developments in the biosciences 
and in the contribution of the professional to public debate in these 
areas. (2) In tracing possible questionable assumptions behind general 
use of the slogan, I hope that professionals in religion and medicine 
will clarify concepts and premises used in their more formal 
theorizing. Noting weaknesses in public discussion may help locate 
parallel or related areas of unclarity in theology or philosophy. This 
poses the challenge to clarify scholarly concepts as well. (3) By 
proposing possible lines of thought for developing more useful mean-
ings of the "playing God" theme, I hope to encourage discussion of 
the concept in a way to include a balance of positive with negative 
connotations. 
Before proposing a constructive statement of my own on possible 
ethical utility for the concept of playing God, I will proceed with a 
brief analysis of perspectives from which the general use of the phrase 
may be interpreted. The first approach to understanding the phrase 
"playing God" combines the philosophy of language analysis and the 
emotivist understanding of moral language. Language analysis phil-
osophers propose that one way to understand the meaning of language 
is to examine its use. Emotivists describe moral language as the 
language of emotion, expressed feelings rather than concepts or ideas. 
Observing the use of the concept of playing God, particularly in pop-
ular sloganeering, it is clear that there is often more emotion than 
thought being expressed. Three emotions seem to me to be especially 
common in such use, each expressing a negative connotation, suggest-
ing that we cannot or ought not to play God. 
These emotions are the feelings of ignorance, fear and disapproval. 
"We can't play God" often means "we don't know how to deal with" 
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questions of the magnitude we are now facing. After all, how would 
one begin to assess quality of life or the possible shades of meaning of 
life and death from conception to expiration? What does "human life" 
mean? Answers seem beyond our grasp, and so, we assume, they must 
lie in God's domain of wisdom. But placing God in the gaps of our 
knowledge presents both a limited understanding of God and one 
which may, as has happened in past God-of-the-gaps theologies, see 
divinity decline as human knowledge increases. Secondly, "we should 
not play God" may simply express fear. Images of "mad scientists," of 
experiments gone awry, of N azian barbarism provoke understandable 
feelings of fright, even terror. Shrinking from the negative uses of 
advanced biotechnologies, we shun all uses. Forgetting that abuse, 
which is possible of all technologies, need not necessarily exclude use, 
we categorize all biotechnologies as playing God and thus beyond our 
legitimate sphere of action. Finally, "you can't play God" may easily 
be intended as a general expression of our disapproval. Because I don't 
want to take a certain action, for whatever ethical, political or per-
sonal reason, I seek to inhibit your carrying it out by placing it in the 
negative category of "playing God." By so doing, however, I may be 
both prejudging the action and obscuring the meaning of the phrase 
by making it simply a gloss on judgments which I have made on other 
grounds. 
Playing God a Vehicle for Feelings 
The language analysis/emotivist perspective does reveal how the 
concept of playing God can be, and often is, a vehicle to convey 
feelings. Used as such, the idea does little to aid ethical deliberation 
and decision-making. But we would be wrong to assume that because 
the phrase is used to express emotion, this is its only use. The phrase, 
at least in a somewhat more reflective usage, also intends to propose a 
cognitive element. A conceptual as well as emotional use is present. 
We turn, then, to two conceptual perspectives. 
We examine first what I will call the "natural versus unnatural" 
perspective. From this viewpoint, "we should not play God" means 
that we should not tamper with nature. Or, since we have apparently 
accepted a wide range of manipulation of other parts of nature, we 
may mean we should not tamper with human nature. In either case, 
the premise seems to be that nature is God's domain and its laws His 
laws. Thus, to attempt to alter or manipulate nature is to steal the 
divine prerogative and claim for ourselves the power of deity. But I 
would suggest that this "natural versus unnatural" conceptual frame-
work is supported by questionable assumptions which, when 
addressed, tend to diminish the usefulness of this perspective; or at 
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least suggest that those questionable assumptions be identified and 
replaced by correct cognitive meanings of "natural" when used in 
moral argument. 
It is often assumed that natural means good or right. To act 
according to nature is to act correctly. Yet there is much in nature 
that we do not accept as good or right - disease, famine, "natural" 
disasters - things which we commend ourselves on acting to over-
come. In many other ways we act to alter or manipulate nature to 
make it better - agricultural hybridization, energy development, 
artificial medications. Some would contend that it is an ideal nature, 
i.e., nature in the abstract, nature as "intended to be," which is good. 
Thus we can act on imperfect nature in its light. If we accept this 
modification, however, we may have lost objective nature as a guide 
and the contours of the ideal nature become open to analysis and 
debate and hence are less useful as guides for actions. It seems also 
assumed that nature is static. It is an unchanging standard against 
which actions can be assessed. But modern science, anthropology, and 
philosophy have called this fixedness into question. The contemporary 
nature-as-change model has implications for viewing human nature as 
well, implications which question the static understanding of man. 
Finally, in relation to human nature, nature is sometimes described in 
limited biological-scientific terms. Just where one would think 
theology, with its recognition of human spirituality, would do other-
wise, it seems at times to restrict human nature primarily to biological 
considerations. But I would suggest that human nature cannot be 
equated with biological nature. In fact, it is central to human nature to 
rise above biological nature. Hence, to describe the human experience 
of reproduction, life enhancement and dying in primarily biological 
terms is to miss the point of true human nature. 
The emotivist perspective tells us something about feelings but little 
about the content of the playing God motif. The " riatural- versus-
unnatural" analysis moves to the conceptual level, but, because of 
ambiguity in its use of the term "nature," leaves us on uncertain 
ethical ground. A third approach builds on the second but is more 
distinctly theological in its immediate expression. For reasons soon to 
be clear, I call this perspective "theological fatalism." Though not 
often articulated in such a direct fashion theologically, underlying this 
position is the vague assumption that all that happens is God's doing. 
Like the preceding perspective, this applies to human history as well as 
to nature. All things - the beginning of life to its end - happen at 
their "appointed time." To tamper with or manipUlate these occur-
rences is to resist God's action, to usurp His position. Such a view, 
while psychologically comforting at times of crisis events outside our 
control, seldom is applied to the rest of life. Further, it contains its 
own theological problems. To the degree that it subsumes nature into 
God's action, it is open' to some of the same questions just raised 
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about the "natural- versus - unnatural" perspective. Beyond this, it 
commits us to a kind of theological fatalism few would be willing to 
admit or defend. Life would become a charade, the playing out of a 
series of divinely programmed actions. The greatness and tragedy 
arising from human freedom would be lost. "When your time is up, 
it's up" may be good fatalism, even entertaining movie-making, but it 
is questionable theology. Further, if all that happens is indeed God's 
doing, then so would our "tampering" or "manipulation" of nature or 
history be his action; and thus it too would be legitimate. 
Many are uncomfortable with this all-encompassing theological 
fatalism and would modify it to apply only, or most specifically, to 
beginning· of-life and end-of-life processes. Most of the current "play-
ing God" discussion pertains to reproductive technologies and deci-
sions to permit or enact death. It is argued that "God is the sole giver 
and taker of life." To manipulate those processes is to take God's role 
to ourselves. But to maintain the life and death processes as God-
ordained is theologically arbitrary. Why these processes and not 
others? Further, such a position overlooks the interconnectedness of 
life and its events, so that one cannot simply isolate some events as 
ordained and leave others leading up to and away from them less so. 
I have argued thus far that the concept of "playing God" is often 
used in an emotionally functional but ethically weak fashion. I have 
also maintained that two widely held conceptual uses of the idea are 
vague and that, upon closer examination, they are fraught with 
ambiguous or uncomfortable assumptions which make them question-
able as guides to moral reflection and action. Is there then no useful 
meaning to the concept? Shall we dismiss the concept as ethically 
without content? There does remain, I shall argue , utility in the con-
cept, less precise than we might like, but of some use nonetheless. To 
see this, we must change the connotation of the idea from pejorative 
to descriptive and normative. My thesis would be this: because we 
cannot avoid playing God, we must play God responsibly. 
I begin with the assumption that playing God has something to do 
with determining life's beginning, quality and end. After all, God is 
understood in our religious tradition as Creator and Sustainer of life. 
To act in such a way as to affect life's beginning, quality and end is 
thus, in one sense, to do God-like things. Now, in a general way, 
decisions we make in many circumstances affect these areas of life. 
Decisions concerning living conditions, food additives, pollution 
controls, medical research, war and peace - all impinge on life's 
beginning, quality and end. In that sense we are always playing 
God. But in more specific ways we play God at life's beginning and 
end. Through family planning, natural or artificial, we determine the 
time of conception. Through choices of age to bear children and diet 
and activity during pregnancy, we tip the probabilities of the health or 
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defectiveness of fetus and infant. Through chosen lifestyles we deter-
mine probabilities of death. Through choosing medical treatments or 
in rejecting them, we affect the quality and duration of the dying 
process. Even more specifically, to have the knowledge concerning 
gene manipulation which may, for example, cure diabetes or increase 
IQ in future generations, either choice - to use that knowledge or not 
to - does affect the quality of life of the future. To have the machinery 
which will postpone, even briefly, an individual's approaching death 
makes us face a choice which will determine the duration of that 
dying, whether the choice is to use the machine or not. 
Viewed descriptively, playing God is unavoidable. We cannot refrain 
! from affecting life's beginning, quality and end. Indirectly or directly 
our decisions have an effect. Here, as elsewhere, the saying holds 
true - even not to decide is to decide. Inaction itself is a cause when 
action would have brought a different result. Being responsible for 
life-affecting and death-affecting decisions is central to the concept of 
what it means to play God. Such responsibility arises out of knowl-
edge and choice. Where we have no choice or no knowledge on which 
to make choice, we are not playing God. But once knowledge and 
choice enter in, playing God is unavoidable. 
Guidelines for Decision-Making 
The concept of playing God can move beyond descriptive to 
normative content as well. As such, it sets both a context and general 
guidelines for decision-making. In setting the context for decision-
making, the idea of playing God reminds us that we are not God! 
That is, this concept recalls the limitations of human understanding. 1 
The feeling of ignorance described earlier in this essay has its cognitive 
counterpart in the recognition of human finitude. This acknowl-
edgment establishes a context in which decisions are approached with • 
humility and a willingness not to blunder naively ahead. Some, with a 
"technological mentality," may feel that "can" equals "should."2 The 
context set by the concept of playing God does not agree. But while 1 
"can" does not necessarily equal "should," it does mean that we need 
to inquire whether and/or how. In this sense, the idea of playing God I 
does contain a warning - a warning about human limitedness and the 
possible folly of technological optimism. It is not a warning to avoid l 
crossing a certain line, but to consider such a move responsibly and 
humbly. I 
The playing God concept also hints at certain positive guidelines for 
ethical decision-making. Playing God calls on us to - play God. That 
is, we ought to play God like God. We are to pattern our actions and 
decisions on the model of our understanding of God. Determination 
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of such guidelines is, of course, no easy matter, though it is not 
necessarily more difficult here than in any other area of religious 
ethics. Guidelines will tend to be general, thereby also making applica-
tion a matter of deliberation and debate. But while determination and 
application of principles is problematic, such an exercise is not with-
out benefit. Though not likely to give us precise directives, seeing the 
concept of "playing God" as normative will give us preferred direc-
tions to pursue. 
Several principles of some relevance to bioethics can be sketched as 
examples of the application of the norm of playing God. (1) God is 
portrayed as being the God of death as well as life, hence, biological 
death is not the ultimate enemy to be opposed at all costs. Death can 
be an acceptable part of life. (2) Our tradition sees God as "no 
respecter of persons." Individuals are thus viewed as having value 
simply by being, not primarily by social rank or contribution. Because 
of this we will favor egalitarian decisions over those which rank people 
by presumed merit. (3) God is seen as protector and liberator of the 
week, the needy, the oppressed. Thus we will favor protection of the 
defenseless and oppose use and abuse of persons, especially those who 
are dependent and easily manipulated. (4) Growth in human moral 
stature is a religious value. This can be translated to mean support for 
self-determination and opposition to actions which control others or 
limit their growth in decision-making and responsibility. (5) Tech-
nologies which show promise of providing for human fulfillment and 
betterment, values in our religious tradition, will be accepted. (6) 
Because the image of God as Judge reminds us of human "sinfulness," 
we will recognize the need to build in checks against individual and 
social selfishness and tendencies to step too quickly' beyond our 
current limitations. 
Portraying the concept of playing God as I have: points us toward 
uncharted territory. New technologies and new knowledge bring new 
responsibilities. Answers are sought where there were not even ques-
tions before. Converting the phrase "playing God" from a prohibition 
to an invitation calls us to risky and fearful decisions. But, as I have 
argued, playing God is unavoidable. The only question is whether we 
shall do so thoughtfully or not. Bernard Haring asks whether the 
human bios and psyche can legitimately be seen as coming within the 
realm of man's stewardship. He answers: 
It is my thesis that he has to interpret his stewardship in the light of his 
noblest vocation. In that interpretation, he can freely interfere with and 
manipulate the functions of his bios and psyche insofar as this does not 
degrade him or diminish his own or his fellowman 's dignity and freedom. 
Not only nature around him but his own natural being - his biological, 
psychological reality - call for his free stewardship, his creative cooperation 
with the divine artist. 3 
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Some years ago, Leroy Augenstein wrote a book based on the 
assumption that the then -emerging technologies would be used; it 
remained only to determine how to use them responsibly.4 I con-
clude my remarks with the challenge of the title of that book: Come, 
let us play God. 
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